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ABSTRACT 
ANALYST FOLLOWING, CAPITAL MARKET PRESSURE, AND REAL ACTIVITY 
MANIPULATION 
Melanie Maureen Rose 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand 
I investigate the impact of analyst following on real activity manipulation. 
Because analysts follow firms and serve as information intermediaries, analyst following 
should reduce earnings management through real activity manipulation. However, given 
the negative ramifications of missing analysts' earnings forecasts, the fact that analysts 
are watching and issuing forecasts might actually create capital market pressures as 
managers try to ensure that they do not miss earnings targets. Because managers can 
engage in earnings management through real activities manipulation and accrual 
manipulation, I control for accrual manipulation in examining the relationship between 
analyst following and real activity manipulation. I find that analyst following is 
associated with more real activities earnings management. I also find evidence that 
discretionary accrual manipulation and real activity manipulation are used as substitutes 
to manage earnings. These findings provide valuable information for model specification 
for future research that investigates earnings management. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The negative market response to missing earnings targets provides a powerful 
incentive for management to meet earnings forecasts. Ideally, meeting these targets is 
accomplished through normal operational activities. However, these targets can also be 
met by manipulating accruals and/or real activities which can negatively impact long-
term firm value. Therefore, the existence of governance and monitoring mechanisms that 
can effectively curb accrual and real activity manipulation are important. 
Security analysts follow firms and provide market information and therefore may 
serve an important monitoring role in reducing accrual and real activity manipulation. 
However, because of attention to analyst forecasts and the negative market reaction for 
firms that miss earnings targets, analyst following might actually exacerbate accrual and 
real activity manipulation by management. This paper investigates whether security 
analysts effectively function as external monitors reducing earnings management through 
real activity manipulation or whether they create capital market pressure which induces 
more manipulation. 
Theoretically, the alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders through 
contracts and monitoring should make this type of manipulation unlikely. However, some 
managerial incentive structures, such as compensation tied to share price or other 
accounting variables, can create pressure to manipulate earnings. The costs associated 
with this type of manipulation, whether in the form of reduced transparency about the 
actual state of the firm or through the expenditure of non-value producing managerial 
effort, can be detrimental to the long-term performance of the company [Gunny (2005), 
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Graham et al (2005), Zang (2007), Cohen and Zarowin (2010)]. Although several prior 
studies have found that analyst following is associated with higher performance measures 
[Merton (1987), Moyer et al (1989), Chung and Jo (1996), Doukas et al (2000), Das et al 
(2006)], there is limited research that investigates the contribution of analyst following in 
reducing real activities earnings management. 
Earnings management stems from management's ability to use discretion in 
financial reporting. Managers routinely estimate future economic events, choose among 
accounting methods for reporting transactions, use judgment in the management of 
working capital, and decide when to realize or defer expenses. In this paper, I define 
earnings management using a frequently referenced definition by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999). "Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers."1 Therefore earnings 
management can be viewed as an agency dilemma, especially if some stakeholders are 
not able to recognize and appropriately discount earnings numbers obtained through 
manipulation. 
Much of the earnings management literature focuses on accrual management. 
Accrual management is identified by abnormal levels of discretionary accruals. 
However, managers can manipulate earnings through either accruals or real activities. 
Rowychowdhury (2006) defines real activity manipulation as departures from normal 
operational practices, motivated by managers' desire to mislead at least some 
stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal 
1
 In this paper, I use earnings management and earnings manipulation interchangeably. 
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course of operations. Because accrual manipulation and real activity manipulation are 
likely used together to obtain a desired outcome, both should be examined together. This 
paper contributes to the literature by examining the monitoring role that analysts may 
play in reducing real activity manipulation. The paper also provides additional insight on 
the monitoring role of analysts in reducing accrual management which has been studied 
previously in the literature, but not in the context of substitutability between accrual 
management and real activity management. The results indicate analyst following is 
associated with higher real activities manipulation as measured by the proxies in this 
paper. In addition, the results confirm a substitution relationship between discretionary 
accrual manipulation and the real activity manipulation proxies. This finding provides 
valuable information for model specification in future research that investigates earnings 
management. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review and a discussion of the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables 
used. Section 4 provides detailed results of the relationship between analyst following 
and real activity manipulation. Section 5 discloses various robustness checks. Section 6 
summarizes the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Because managers have some discretion in accounting, including deciding when 
to realize or defer income and expenses, they are able to affect reported earnings numbers 
through accruals. Ideally, this discretion should allow the manager to provide additional 
insight into the state of the firm that would not otherwise show up in actual cash flows. 
However, as noted above, instead of providing additional clarity, discretionary accruals 
can also be used as a tool to mislead stakeholders, to avoid the negative reaction of 
missing earnings projections or to affect the outcome of some other market event. The 
earnings management literature primarily focuses on actions to bridge gaps between 
expectations and performance and to affect the outcome of capital market transactions. 
2.1 Earnings Management and Performance 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Burgstahler and Eames (2003) investigate the 
distribution of reported earnings scaled by market value and find a discontinuity around 
the zero earnings threshold. The papers report a high frequency of firms with small 
earnings increases and positive income and a low frequency of firms with small decreases 
in earnings and reported losses. The authors attribute this discontinuity to earnings 
management to report positive income gains. In these papers, earnings management 
identification is based solely on distributional analysis. A significant amount of 
subsequent research has also attributed the discontinuity of the earnings distribution 
around the zero thresholds to earnings management.2 Burgstahler and Eames (2003) also 
find that firms manage earnings to avoid both losses and earnings decreases. In addition, 
2 
The following is a list of a few of the studies: Collins, Pincus, and Xie [1999], Degeorge, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser [1999], Kang [1999], Easton [1999], Baber and Kang [2002], Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson 
[2007], Gunny, Jacob, and Jorgensen [2007], Jacob and Jorgensen [2007] 
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they find evidence that analysts fail to incorporate the earnings management that actually 
occurs into their forecasts making it beneficial for managers to "game the system." 
More recently, researchers have questioned the identification and conclusion of 
earnings management based on distributional analysis. Durtschi and Easton (2005) and 
Durtschi and Easton (2009) contend that the discontinuities around the zero earnings 
threshold result from sample selection bias and scaling. Specifically, they argue that the 
discontinuity is an artifact caused by elimination of observations with missing data. They 
also contend that deflating earnings by market capitalization affects the resultant 
distribution. They observe that the market capitalization of companies reporting a loss 
tends to be smaller than that of companies reporting the same absolute value of profit. 
Therefore, larger deflators for the profit firms will cause those firms to accumulate in the 
smallest positive interval when scaled. For loss firms, scaling with market capitalizations 
that are lower in absolute value than those for the profit firms will lead to less 
accumulation of entries near the zero threshold. Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) challenge 
the Durtschi and Easton (2005, 2009) findings. By aggregating quarterly earnings over 
periods ending in months other than the fiscal period end month, Jacob and Jorgensen 
(2007) calculate alternative annual earnings measures. If there is earnings management 
at fiscal year end to meet targets, the discontinuity should be more apparent for fiscal 
year-end earnings numbers than for the alternative earnings periods. They confirm prior 
findings in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) of earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses in all scaled earnings measures. Their analysis also indicates a 
discontinuity at zero in the distribution of unsealed net income. Although the debate 
continues about the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings around zero and whether 
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this discontinuity can be attributed to earnings management, other literature provides 
evidence of manipulation through accruals and real activities. 
DeGeorge et al (1999) find evidence that managers manipulate earnings to try to 
"jump over the line." Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, 
they identify earnings management to beat two additional benchmarks- performance 
relative to the prior comparable period and relative to analysts' earnings projections. 
Dechow et al. (2003) also investigate whether firms that just met thresholds of zero 
earnings and zero changes in earnings engage in accrual manipulation to meet these 
thresholds. They find no significant difference in accruals for small profit and loss firms 
and suggest that managers in the sample are instead using real actions to meet earnings 
targets. However, Hansen (2010) provides another rationale for the lack of confirmatory 
findings of accrual management to meet targets in the Dechow et al (2003) study. 
Hansen (2010) points out firms may be managing earnings to respond to incentives other 
than the incentive under investigation. After controlling for alternative benchmarks (for 
example, earnings changes), Hansen finds that firms with small profits have discretionary 
accruals that are significantly higher than firms with small losses providing additional 
evidence of discretionary accrual earnings management tied to various performance 
targets. 
Other literature suggests that earnings management to meet performance 
benchmarks is not accomplished solely through accrual management. Gunny (2010) 
asserts that manipulating accruals is subject to higher risk of SEC scrutiny. She looks at 
R&D expense, SG&A expense, timing of the sale of fixed assets and overproduction 
(discussed in more detail in section 3.3) as real activity manipulation tools. She finds a 
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positive association between real activity manipulation and meeting earnings 
benchmarks. Collectively, these studies provide evidence that earnings management to 
meet benchmarks exists and also for the direction of this study in controlling for accrual 
manipulation when examining the effect of analyst following on real activity 
management. 
2.2 Earnings Management and Capital Market Transactions 
Researchers have documented valuation issues that result from earnings 
management. For example, Teoh et al (1998b) examine whether aggressive income-
increasing accounting accruals increase investor optimism about SEOs. They find higher 
net income growth in the issue year for SEO firms relative to performance matched non-
issuing comparable firms. Post-issue, they find that the SEO firms significantly under 
perform their matches. They attribute the optimism that drives the market overvaluation 
of SEOs to inflated earnings numbers garnered through accrual manipulation and the 
underperformance to a market correction back to fundamental value. Miznik and 
Jacobson (2007) also examine earnings management around SEOs. They find that firms 
tend to inflate earnings numbers using both accrual and real activity manipulation before 
SEOs and that the market also overvalues these firms. The long-run performance issues 
associated with earnings management are also prevalent in the IPO market. Teoh et al 
(1998a) also examine whether discretionary accruals predict the cross-sectional variation 
in post-IPO long run stock performance. They find evidence that firms with abnormally 
high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock performance in the three years 
following issuance. The stock under performance is directly related to the degree of the 
accrual earnings management. They find that the most aggressive earnings management 
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firms have three-year after market stock returns that are approximately 20 percent less 
than the most conservative earnings management firms. Given the long-run performance 
outcomes associated with earnings management, an important question is what 
governance mechanisms can successfully mitigate the behavior. 
2.3 Earnings Management and Corporate Governance 
Prior research has examined the effectiveness of some corporate governance 
mechanisms in controlling earnings management through accruals. For example, Chung 
and Jeong-Bon (2002) find a negative relationship between institutional holdings and 
accrual management. Peasnell et al (2000) show that outside members on audit 
committees and governance boards reduce abnormal accruals. Similarly Matsumoto 
(2002) finds that firms with higher transient institutional ownership are more likely to use 
discretionary accruals and forecast guidance to meet or beat expectations at earnings 
announcement. In addition, Luez et al (2003) examine the role of investor protection in 
controlling earnings management. They find that the quality of minority shareholder 
rights and the strength of legal enforcement reduce accrual earnings management. 
Collectively, the results of these studies suggest that effective governance/external 
monitoring can reduce the agency problems of accrual management. This paper examines 
the relationship between analyst following and various earnings management measures to 
determine if analysts are successful monitors in reducing accrual and real activity 
management. 
2.4 Accrual Manipulation and Real Activity Manipulation 
A survey study by Graham, Harvey, and Rajpol (2005) suggests that real activity 
manipulation may be more prevalent than accrual manipulation. Eighty percent of the 
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managers surveyed in the Graham study reported that they would decrease spending on 
R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target. More than fifty percent of 
respondents stated that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target, 
even if such a delay would be non value maximizing. These findings are significant 
because they suggest that not only do managers feel significant pressure to meet targets, 
but also that they are creative in finding mechanisms, other than accruals, to reach 
targets. Further evidence of this is given by Chi et al (2011) when they find that higher 
quality auditors and longer audit tenure constrain accrual management but with an 
unintended consequence that firms resort to real activities earnings management. Other 
literature suggests that the reliance on earnings management through real activity 
manipulation may also be more prevalent because of the attention that investors and other 
regulators give to accounting figures in the wake of major accounting scandals. 
In a working paper, Zang (2007) investigates the relationship between real 
activity and accrual management. She finds a degree of substitutability between real 
activity manipulation and accrual manipulation. Specifically, she finds that an increase in 
the cost of one type of manipulation leads to an increase in the level of the other type. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) also examine the relationship between real and accrual 
earnings management. They report that SEO firms engage in both real and accrual 
manipulation and that as the cost of accrual management increases, firms engage in more 
real activity manipulation. Interestingly, they find that the decline in post-SEO 
performance due to the real activities management is more severe than that due to accrual 
management. If the long-run performance implications of real activity manipulation 
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expand beyond the SEO market, identifying mechanisms that can reduce this 
opportunistic behavior is important. 
2.5 Earnings Management and Analyst Following 
Most of the recent research on analyst following and earnings management 
focuses on discretionary accruals alone as the earnings management tool. Ahmed et al 
(2005) examine the effects of earnings management on analysts' forecasts. They find 
that analysts' forecasts do not correctly predict the difference in the persistence between 
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals (discretionary accruals display less 
persistence than non-discretionary accruals). If firms use accrual manipulation to meet 
performance benchmarks in one period, this inefficiency in analysts' forecasts could 
cause managers to engage in a cycle of accrual manipulation to meet future earnings 
targets. 
Degeorge et al (2005) examine the role that analysts play in either reducing or 
exacerbating discretionary accrual earnings management. Across an international sample, 
they find evidence that analysts are more effective monitors in transparent environments 
than in opaque environments and also find that firms in transparent countries use short-
term earnings management techniques to reach the consensus analyst forecast. 
Controlling for possible endogeneity of analyst coverage, Yu (2008) also examines 
analysts' influence on discretionary accruals earnings management decisions. He finds 
that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less and the result is more 
pronounced for more experienced analysts and for analysts from top brokers. Similarly, 
Knyazeva (2007) finds that the effect of analyst following on firm performance is similar 
to the effect of other corporate governance mechanisms and that analyst following is 
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associated with lower discretionary accrual earnings management. A study by Sun and 
Liu (2011) finds a positive relationship between analyst coverage and accounting 
conservatism, defined as accounting that recognizes losses as they are discovered, but 
defers gains until they are verified. This rule of thumb approach to recording losses and 
gains reduces the case by case discretion that managers have over accruals. Their results 
suggest that firms engage in less accrual management and choose more conservative 
accounting methods when they are followed by more analysts than when they are 
followed by fewer analysts. Collectively, these studies suggest that analysts are 
successful in reducing earnings manipulation through discretionary accruals. However, 
more research is needed to determine if analyst following is successful at reducing 
multiple types of earnings management behavior or if analyst following is associated with 
managers substituting out of discretionary accruals as the earnings management tool into 
other types of earnings management. 
A recent study by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) provides some limited evidence that 
analyst following can curb both accrual and real activity manipulation. They conduct 
maximum likelihood estimation using an earnings management dummy variable as the 
dependent variable. The earnings management dummy is set to 1 if any of their earnings 
management proxies (accrual based or real activity based) is above the industry-year 
median. They find a significantly negative relationship between the earnings management 
dummies and analyst following. While this paper does present some evidence that 
analyst following can curb real earnings management behavior, the model estimated does 
not take into account the interplay in the relationship between accrual and real activity 
manipulation. An examination of analyst following on real activity earnings management 
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that takes into account accrual management will provide additional insight on the 
monitoring role of analysts. Specifically, this paper will provide insight on how analyst 
following affects the interplay between accrual and real activity manipulation and 
whether analyst coverage simply induces managers to switch between earnings 
management mechanisms. 
2.6 Hypotheses 
Because model misspecification may be influencing prior findings on analyst 
following and earnings management, I test that there is no relationship between analyst 
following and real activity manipulation while controlling for accrual management. 
HI: There is no significant relationship between analyst following and real activities 
manipulation. 
Finding support for HI would be a significant contribution to the literature and provide 
information on specification of models dealing with accrual and/or real activity 
manipulation. 
Failure to find support for HI would indicate that either the "monitoring 
effectiveness" or the "capital market pressure" argument explains the relationship 
between analyst following and real activity manipulation. In the monitoring effectiveness 
hypothesis, analyst following is successful in reducing real activity manipulation. In the 
capital market pressure hypothesis, analyst following creates pressure to manipulate to 
meet benchmarks. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Data sources, variable construction, and sample description 
3.1 Data Sources 
Data sources for this paper include the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), Compustat, ExecuComp, the and Institutional Brokers' Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) databases. I exclude banks/financial firms, utilities, and other regulated 
industries. Data on firm characteristics are either obtained from or calculated with data 
from CRSP and Compustat. Analyst following information is obtained from I/B/E/S. 
Compensation data is for the active CEO for the year as listed in ExecuComp. I use 
annual data to pick up earnings management to meet annual earnings targets, a frequently 
cited goal of earnings management. The sample data spans the time period from 1992-
2006 with 32,117 observations across the firm-years. 
3.2 Measures of Discretionary Accruals 
Earnings management can be proxied using discretionary accruals. The methods 
for estimating discretionary accruals range from calculating simple averages to more 
involved estimation techniques. In most models, total accruals are calculated and then 
separated into nondiscretionary and discretionary components. The most frequently cited 
and used methods for measuring earnings management are the Jones Model (1991) and 
the modified Jones Model (Dechow et al, 1995). First total accruals are calculated as 
follows: 
TA
 t/ AM = (ACA t -ACL t -ACASH t +A STDEBT t -DEP t)/At_i (1) 
where 
TA is total accruals for the firm in year t; 
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AC A is the change in current assets between year t and t-1; 
ACL is the change in current liabilities between year t and t-1; 
AC ASH is the change in cash and short term investments between year t and t-1, 
ASTDEBT is the change in debt in current liabilities between year t and t-1; 
DEP is the year t depreciation and amortization expense and 
At_i is lagged total assets. 
The following equation is then estimated as an interim step in calculating the predicted 
value of accruals. 
TAt / At-i = <xi / At-i + a 2 (ASALES t)/ AM + a 3 PPE t/ At-i + s t (2) 
where ASALES is the change in revenues between time t and t-1, PPE is gross property, 
plant, and equipment, and all other variables are as defined above. The predicted values 
of total accruals are calculated using the parameters estimates from equation 2a, but 
adjusting the change in revenues by the change in receivables. This modification is 
necessary because the Jones model treats revenues as completely non-discretionary. If 
earnings are managed by shifting revenues from future periods, we need to adjust the 
change in revenues for the change in receivables. Therefore the predicted value of total 
accruals is calculated using the following equation. 
PTA
 t = di / AM + d 2 [(A SALES t - AREC t)]/ At.i + d 3 PPE t / AM (3) 
where PTA is the predicted value of total accruals for firm i in year t, and AREC is the 
change in net receivables between year t and t-1, and all other variables are as previously 
defined. Finally, the variable of interest DA, discretionary accruals, is defined as total 
accruals (TA) minus the predicted value of total accruals (PTA). 
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In order to account for industry and economy wide influences on discretionary 
accruals, a cross-sectional variation of the Jones model requires that sample firms are 
grouped according to the two-digit SIC code. Equation 2 is then estimated for each SIC 
group. Discretionary accruals for each firm are found using the same approach as in the 
times series Jones model but with the parameter estimates from the respective SIC 
groups. In this paper, I use the modified Jones approach to calculate discretionary 
accruals due to its widespread acceptance in the literature. 
3.3 Measures of Real Activity Manipulation 
Real activity earnings management involves the manipulation of operating 
variables such as R&D expenses and production levels. A study by Roychowdhury 
(2006) uses deviations from abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
and abnormal cash flow from operations, as proxies for real activities manipulation that 
result from the following manipulation methods. 
1. Sales manipulation- accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating additional 
unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms; 
2. Reduction of discretionary expenditures 
3. Overproduction, or increasing production to report lower COGS. 
With sales manipulation, the cash inflow per sale is lower than normal because of 
price discounts or more lenient credit terms. As the additional sales are realized, total 
current period earnings are higher but the lower per unit margins mean that production 
costs relative to sales will be abnormally high. Cash flow from operations, (CFO) is 
abnormally low and production costs are relatively high given the level of sales. If 
managers reduce discretionary expenses (DISEXP) as a real activity manipulation tool, 
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the firm will exhibit unusually low discretionary expenses which would translate into 
lower cash outflows and a positive effect on current period CFO. For manufacturing 
firms, overproduction spreads fixed costs over a larger output and therefore can reduce 
total per unit costs. The firm would show better operating margins because the reported 
cost of goods sold (COGS) is lower. However the firm incurs production and holding 
costs for the excess inventory that are not recovered in the current period which results in 
higher production costs relative to sales level. In order to generate production costs for 
non manufacturing firms, Roychowdhury (2006) defines production costs (PROD) as the 
sum of COGS and change in inventory (INV) during the period. 
In the CFO model, Roychowdhury, following Dechow et al (1998) in calculating 
CFO, DISEXP and PROD, uses the following equation to estimate the normal level of 
CFO: 
CFO,/ AM = ao + a, (1/ AM) + a2 (SALES,)/ A,., + a3 (ASALES,)/ A,_i+ s (4) 
where CFOt is cash flow from operations in period t, At.i is lagged total assets at the end 
of period t-1, SALESt is sales for period t and ASALESt is the change in sales between 
period t and t-1. Roychowdhury (2006) points out that it is customary to include a scaled 
intercept, cti (1/ An), when estimating non-discretionary accruals to avoid a spurious 
correlation between scaled CFO and scaled sales due to variation in the scaling variable, 
total assets. Following the Roychowdhury approach, I also include a scaled intercept to 
ensure that the mean abnormal CFO is zero. Including the intercepts allows the average 
CFOt/ At-i to be non-zero even when the primary explanatory variables in the model, 
sales and change-in-sales, are zero. He also includes an un-scaled intercept to ensure that 
the mean abnormal CFO for every industry-year is zero. He finds that eliminating the un-
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scaled intercept does not materially affect the results. Abnormal cash flow is the 
difference between reported CFO and the estimated value of normal CFO calculated 
using the coefficients from equation 4. Similarly, discretionary expenditures, DISEXP, 
(which includes R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses) are 
a function of sales and lagged sales such that: 
DISEXP/ At.i = a0 + ai (1/ At.i) + a2 (SALESt)/ AM +a3 (SALESt-i)/ AM + s (5) 
and abnormal expenses are the difference between actual DISEXP and the estimated 
value of normal DISEXP calculated using the coefficients from equation 5 above. 
Finally, production costs are estimated using the following equations for COGS and INV. 
COGS/ AM = a0 + ai (1/ AM) + a2 (SALES,)/ AM + s (6) 
AINV= a0 + ai (1/ AM) + a2 (ASALESt)/ At +a3 (ASALESM)/ AM + 8 (7) 
Production costs equal the sum of COGS and AINV such that 
PROD= a0 (1/ AM) + oi (SALESt)/ AM + a2 (ASALES,)/ A-i +a3 (ASALESM)/ AM + s (8) 
Each of the variables of interest (CFO, DISEXP, PROD) are estimated and abnormal 
levels are defined as actual values minus the respective predicted values. The two-digit 
SIC code is used for cross section estimation. 
Mizik and Jacobson (2007) use ROA and R&D intensity surprises to proxy real 
activity manipulation. Specifically they posit that firms that simultaneously report a 
positive ROA surprise and a negative surprise to R&D intensity are likely to have 
manipulated earnings. They find that ROA and R&D intensity are well approximated by 
a fixed effects first-order autoregressive panel data model adjusted for firm specific and 
time specific effects (Arellano 2003). Therefore they use the following models to 
estimate predicted ROA and R&D intensity: 
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ROAit = a, + cp* ROAlt_i+ 2 8 T* TIME(t) + slt, (9) 
RDlt = a, + q>*RDlt.i+ S 5 T * TIME(x) + e„, (10) 
ROAiM and RD,t.i are lagged values of return on assets and R&D spending respectively. 
TIME(x) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if year is x and 0 otherwise. In both 
equations, the variable of interest has a firm specific component (a,) and a component 
that captures the broader economy (8T). A value of 1 on cp, the first order autoregressive 
coefficient, would indicate that the series follows a random walk and a value of <p=0.00 
indicates that the series returns back to its mean level within a year. Alternative models 
of nested specifications do not perform as well as the model indicated above. 
While the Mizik and Jocobson (2007) measure is appealing because it does not 
force a specification on real activity manipulation, the Roychowdhury (2010) measures 
are more frequently used in the literature. I use the Roychowdhury measures as the 
primary proxies for real activity manipulation. My primary proxies for real activity 
manipulation are abnormal production costs, ABPROD, and abnormal discretionary 
expenses, ABDISEXP. Rather than including analysis for abnormal cash flow from 
operations, ABBCFO, as a standalone proxy, I perform analysis using ABCFO as a 
composite proxy due to some problems in interpreting results for the ABCFO measure. 
Remember that sales manipulation (through price discounts and more lenient credit 
terms), overproduction, and reduction of discretionary expenses all have an effect on 
current period CFO. Sales manipulation causes current period CFO to be abnormally low 
as fewer dollars are logged per sale on average. If spending on discretionary items is in 
the form of cash, reducing these expenditures to artificially prop up earnings lowers cash 
outflows and will have a positive effect on abnormal CFO. Roychowdhury (2006) also 
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points out that with overproduction, the firm incurs production and holding costs on the 
over-produced items that are not recovered in the same period. The outcome is that cash 
flows from operations are lower than normal. Because the manipulation strategies under 
consideration have inconsistent directional effects on abnormal CFO, it would be difficult 
to draw definitive conclusions from the analysis of ABCFO as a standalone measure. 
Following Zang (2007) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), I also create composite 
proxies using ABPROD, ABDISEXP, and ABCFO and test the relationships with these 
proxies as a robustness check. I use the individual components as my primary proxies 
because the processes that generate abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and abnormal cash flow from operations are different, which may make it more 
difficult to identify relationships for the composite measures. Tables 1 and 2 contain 
descriptive statistics and correlation tables for variables of interest. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Models and Analysis 
In this paper, I am testing the effect of analyst coverage3 on earnings management 
through real activity manipulation. Because analyst coverage is associated with many 
factors that may also affect the firms' earnings management decision, I control for these 
factors by first running the following equation. 
NAF= pi + p2 SIZE + p3 VOL + p4 Q + p5 RISK + p6 NAF (-1) (11) 
NAF is the number of analysts following the firm. SIZE, measured by the natural 
logarithm of the total value of sales, is included because Bhushan (1998) shows that 
larger firms are more intensely followed by analysts. VOL, the volume of trading over 
the year, is included because of the incentive that analysts have to follow firms that have 
lots of trading activity. Tobins Q is a proxy for analysts' apriori opinion of the firm. 
McNichols and Obrien (1997) show that analysts are more likely to follow firms for 
which they have a favorable opinion because this lessens the probability that they will 
have to issue negative recommendations. RISK, the variance of the daily stock returns 
calculated over the current year, is included to capture the benefits of following firms 
with greater volatility (McNichols and Obrien, 1997). Previous year analyst following, 
NAF (-1) is included to capture competition among analysts in following firms and is 
expected to be positive. The results are displayed in Table 3. The relationships for the 
variables in the model are consistent with the extant literature. There is a significant 
positive relationship between SIZE and NAF confirming that analysts tend to follow 
larger firms. In addition, the coefficient on VOL suggests that analyst following is 
3
 Analyst coverage and analyst following are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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positively associated with the volume of trading over the year. Analysts' apriori opinion 
of the firm, as proxied by Tobin's Q, positively impacts analyst coverage. The variance 
of daily stock returns, RISK, is found to have a positive impact on analyst coverage 
supporting the idea that there is an incentive for analysts to follow firms with greater 
volatility. Not surprisingly, previous year analyst following, NAF (-1) has a positive 
relationship with current analyst following. Overall, the model explains eighty-seven 
percent of analyst following and all variables are statistically significant. The results are 
consistent with extant literature. 
Following the approach in Yu (2008), I use the residuals from the above 
regression estimation as the main proxy for analyst following in the main equation of 
interest below, equation 12. The residual coverage is the component of analyst coverage 
that is uncorrelated with the controls in equation 11 and is the unexpected component of 
analyst coverage. I perform OLS regression using the real activity manipulation proxies 
as the dependent variables, residual analyst following, NAFRESID, as the proxy for 
analyst following and include various control variables. To control for the relationship 
between real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation, the proxy for accrual 
manipulation, the value of discretionary accruals, DA, is included as an explanatory 
variable. 
RM = a l + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE+ a6DA 
+ a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA4 (12) 
4
 Although not listed as a variable in equation 12,1 also run regressions including institutional ownership as 
an explanatory dummy that is equal to 1 if the proportion of shares held by institutional owners is greater 
than fifty percent. While the results that include institutional ownership are not significantly different from 
the presented results, including the institutional ownership significantly limits the analysis because of the 
number of observations missing this data point. 
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RM represents real activity manipulation as measured by each of the proxies. 
NAFRESIDUAL is residual analyst coverage, the component of analyst coverage that 
cannot be explained by the controls in equation 2. Under the monitoring effectiveness 
hypothesis, the relationship between NAFRESDIUAL and RM as measured by ABPROD 
will be negative. However, if analyst following creates capital market pressure to meet 
targets, the relationship between NAFRESIDUAL and ABPROD will be positive. The 
relationship between NAFRESIDUAL and the proxy ABDISEXP will be positive under 
the monitoring effectiveness hypothesis and negative under the capital market pressure 
hypothesis. I have no prior assumption on the relationship between NAFRESIDUAL and 
the RM proxies. M/B is the market to book ratio and is included to pick up growth 
opportunities of the firm. I expect a negative relationship between M/B and real activity 
manipulation because firms with more growth opportunities are less likely to engage in 
earnings management. LTD, long term debt scaled by total assets, is included to capture 
the influence of the presence of debt holders on real activity manipulation. I expect a 
negative relationship between LTD and earnings management given the monitoring role 
of debt holders in the literature. SIZE, measured by the natural logarithm of the total 
value of sales, is included as a control because it is correlated with many of the variables 
of interest. If firms manage earnings through multiple channels, DA, discretionary 
accruals, should pick up the accounting based earnings management and provide 
additional insight on the relationship between real activity and accrual manipulation. 
DELTA, the lagged value of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and 
VEGA, the lagged value of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility, are 
included to further capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. Therefore I expect 
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both DELTA and VEGA to be associated with more earnings management. Descriptions 
of how DELTA and VEGA are calculated are outlined in Appendix A. Table 4 presents 
the results of the OLS regressions of the various measures of real activity manipulation. 
The results from the OLS model show a statistically significant, positive 
relationship between analyst following and abnormal production costs. Higher abnormal 
production costs result from earnings management using the overproduction strategy. 
Therefore, the results provide support for the capital market pressure hypothesis where 
analyst following creates pressure for managers to manipulate to meet benchmarks. This 
finding is important because extant literature has found that analyst following is 
associated with lower earnings management through discretionary accruals. Given that 
managers have discretion in determining whether to use accrual management or real 
activities strategies, this finding suggests that analyst following might induce managers to 
use real activity manipulation strategies more intensively. As a control, I also included 
DA, discretionary accruals. The significant negative relationship between DA and 
ABPROD suggests that the two manipulation strategies are substitutes. The coefficients 
on LTD and SIZE are also significant and positive suggesting that the presence of debt 
holders and the size of the firm creates capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as 
captured in the ABPROD proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as 
proxied by the M/B ratio, have a significant negative effect on earnings management 
through overproduction. 
Table 4 also presents results for the ABDISEXP proxy for real activity 
manipulation. A significant negative relationship between analyst following and 
abnormal discretionary expenditures indicates that firms are more cautious with 
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discretionary spending in the presence of analyst following. When reduction of 
discretionary expenses is used as the real activity manipulation strategy, discretionary 
spending is lower than normal. In this case, the lower the value of discretionary 
spending, the more likely earnings management to meet some benchmark is occurring. If 
we assume that discretionary expenses are bounded at zero, the negative coefficient 
means that analyst following is associated with a lower level of discretionary 
expenditures. Either firms are abnormally cautious or analyst following creates capital 
market pressure to meet some target. Discretionary accruals, DA, is positively associated 
with abnormal discretionary expenses indicating that the two earnings management 
strategies are substitutes (remember higher levels of discretionary expenses are associated 
with less earnings management). Although not significant in this model, the coefficients 
on LTD and SIZE are negative, suggesting that the presence of debt holders and a large 
market may create capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the 
ABDISEXP proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by 
the M/B ratio, have a significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses 
indicating that growth opportunities are associated with less earnings management 
through discretionary spending. 
4.1 Endogeneity 
I test the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management through real activity 
manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect the information 
environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following. Therefore, to 
address the potential endogeneity, I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. The 
estimated model is as follows. 
NAF= pi + p2 RM + P3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1) 
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RM= al + a2NAF + a3M/B + a4LTD + a5SIZE + a6DA+ (13) 
a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
All the variables are as previously defined. I use the exogenous variables and the 
lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. Table 5 presents the results of the 2SLS 
regression of the various measures of real activity manipulation. The results are 
consistent with the OLS results. The 2SLS results show a statistically significant, positive 
relationship between analyst following and abnormal production costs which provides 
support for the capital market pressure hypothesis where analyst following creates 
pressure for managers to manipulate earnings to meet benchmarks. The significant 
negative relationship between DA and ABPROD again suggests that the two 
manipulation strategies are substitutes. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are also 
significant and positive providing additional support that the presence of debt holders and 
the size of the firm creates capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in 
the ABPROD proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by 
the M/B ratio, have a significant negative effect on earnings management through 
overproduction. This makes sense because firms with more growth opportunities are 
likely to focus efforts on realizing the potential rather than in overproduction. DELTA, 
the CEO pay-performance sensitivity measure is positively associated with earnings 
management through overproduction. 
Table 5 also presents results for the ABDISEXP proxy. A significant negative 
relationship between analyst following and abnormal discretionary expenditures provides 
more evidence that analyst following is associated with earnings management through 
reduction of discretionary expenses. DA, discretionary accruals, is positively associated 
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with abnormal discretionary expenses indicating again that the two earnings management 
strategies are substitutes. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and negative. 
This suggests that the presence of debt holders and a large market may create capital 
market pressure to meet earnings targets by lowering discretionary spending as captured 
in the ABDISEXP proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied 
by the M/B ratio, have a significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses 
indicating that growth opportunities are associated with less earnings management 
through reduction of discretionary spending. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Robustness Checks 
To capture additional information on the relationship between analyst following 
and real activity manipulation, I perform the following robustness checks. First, I 
partition the sample to provide analysis for the post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period. 
Cohen et al (2007) find evidence that firms switched from accrual-based earnings 
management to real activities earnings management after the passage of SOX. Therefore, 
analysis of the post SOX data could provide additional information on whether analyst 
following is associated with less real activity manipulation. I provide analysis from OLS 
and 2SLS regressions in tables 6 and 7 respectively. The post SOX results are consistent 
with the full sample results. 
For the post SOX OLS model, I observe a statistically significant, positive 
relationship between analyst following and abnormal production costs. The magnitude of 
the effect is similar to the full sample results. Again, this supports the capital market 
pressure hypothesis where analyst following is associated with higher measures of 
earnings management, in this case in the form of abnormal production costs. The 
significant negative relationship between DA and ABPROD again suggests that the two 
manipulation strategies are substitutes. However, the magnitude of the relationship is 
smaller post SOX. This may be attributable to a reduction in the use of discretionary 
accruals earnings management in the post SOX period as documented in Cohen et al 
(2007). The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are again significant and positive providing 
additional support that the presence of debt holders and the size of the firm create capital 
market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the ABPROD proxy for real 
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activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a 
significant negative effect on earnings management through overproduction. The 
coefficient on DELTA, the CEO pay-performance sensitivity, is negative but was 
positive in the full sample results. Although I do not investigate the reasons here, it is 
possible that changes in CEO compensation resulting from accounting scandals that led 
to the enhancement of SOX changed the structure of CEO incentives. VEGA, the 
sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility measure is positively associated with 
earnings management through overproduction. 
Table 6 also presents post SOX OLS results for the ABDISEXP proxy. A 
significant negative relationship between analyst following and abnormal discretionary 
expenditures provides more evidence that analyst following is associated with earnings 
management through reduction of discretionary expenses. DA, discretionary accruals, is 
positively associated with abnormal discretionary expenses indicating again that the two 
earnings management strategies are substitutes. However, again the magnitude of the 
relationship between DA and the real activity manipulation proxy is smaller when 
compared to the full sample results. This provides support for a reduced substitutability 
between discretionary accruals and earnings management through reduction of 
discretionary accruals post SOX. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and 
negative. This suggests that the presence of debt holders and a large market may create 
capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the ABDISEXP proxy for 
real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a 
significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses indicating that growth 
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opportunities are associated with less earnings management through reduction of 
discretionary spending. 
The post SOX, 2SLS model results in table 7 are consistent with the post SOX 
OLS results. The model in panel 7A shows a statistically significant, positive relationship 
between analyst following and abnormal production costs which provides support for the 
capital market pressure hypothesis. The significant negative relationship between DA and 
ABPROD again suggests that the two manipulation strategies are substitutes. The 
coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and positive providing additional support 
that the presence of debt holders and the size of the firm create capital market pressure to 
meet earnings targets as captured in the ABPROD proxy for real activity manipulation. 
Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a significant negative effect on 
earnings management. 
The model in panel 7B shows a significant negative relationship between analyst 
following and abnormal discretionary expenditures providing more evidence that analyst 
following is associated with earnings management through reduction of discretionary 
expenses. DA, discretionary accruals, is positively associated with ABDISEXP, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, indicating again that the two earnings management 
strategies are substitutes. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and negative 
suggesting that the presence of debt holders and size of the firm may create capital 
market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the ABDISEXP proxy for real 
activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a 
significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses indicating that growth 
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opportunities are associated with less earnings management through reduction of 
discretionary spending. 
Finally, following Roychowdhury (2006), I combine the primary proxies 
(ABPROD and ABDISEXP) with ABCFO, abnormal cash flow from operations, into 
composite measures. Consistent with Zang (2006), I multiply abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, ABDISEXP, by negative one and add it to abnormal production costs, 
ABPROD, to construct the RM1 proxy. Therefore, the higher this measure, the more 
likely real activity manipulation has occurred. For the next measure, RM2, I multiply 
abnormal cash flows from operations, ABCFO, and abnormal discretionary expenses, 
ABDISEXP, by negative one and add them together. Because the processes that generate 
abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses are 
different, composite measures may make it more difficult to identify relationships. The 
analysis for the composite proxies, RM1 and RM2, is presented in tables 8 and 9 for the 
OLS and 2SLS models respectively. 
Panels 8A and 8B present the OLS results for the RM1 and RM2 proxies. The 
relationships are consistent across both proxies. The results from the model show a 
statistically significant, positive relationship between analyst following and the proxies. 
Given that higher levels of the proxies are associated with more earnings management 
behavior, analyst following is again associated with more earnings management behavior. 
Therefore, the results on the composite proxy provide support for the capital market 
pressure hypothesis where analyst following creates pressure for managers to manipulate 
to meet benchmarks. This affect is moderated by growth opportunities, as measured by 
the market to book ratio, M/B. One explanation is that firms with growth opportunities 
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are less likely to engage in real activities manipulation because managers are focused on 
realizing the potential of the opportunities. The coefficient on discretionary accruals 
indicates a substitution effect between earnings management through accruals and the 
real activity manipulation composite proxies consistent with recent findings. The 2SLS 
results in panels 9A and 9B are also consistent with the previous findings in this paper. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
This study analyzes the impact of analyst following on real activities 
manipulation, while controlling for the level of discretionary accrual earnings 
management. The proxies for real activities earnings management in this paper are based 
on using overproduction to lower the costs of goods sold to report higher margins and 
reducing discretionary expenses below normal levels to bolster earnings. For each of the 
real activities management proxies, I find that analyst following is associated with more 
earnings management. I control for time to ensure that these relationships are not 
spurious across time. This results holds for all proxies in OLS and while controlling for 
endogeneity, through the use of 2SLS. 
I also find evidence that discretionary accrual manipulation and real activity 
manipulation are used as substitutes for all real activity manipulation proxies. This 
finding provides valuable information for model specification for future research that 
investigates earnings management and is consistent with findings in Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) and Zang (2007). I also find evidence that the degree of substitutability between 
real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation is lower for the post SOX period than 
for the pre SOX period. I attribute this to a general reluctance to use accrual management 
strategies post SOX due to increased attention on the accrual accounts from regulators 
post SOX. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables Source Notes on Calculations 
ABPRODCOST 
Abnormal 
Production 
Costs 
Calculated 
Production Costs minus predicted value of production 
costs 
PROD-PPRODCOST 
ABDISEXP 
Abnormal 
Discretionary 
Expense 
Calculated 
Discretionary Expense minus predicted value of 
discretionary expense 
DISEXP-PDISEXP 
ABCFO Abnormal CFO Calculated 
Cash flow from operations minus predicted value of 
cash flow from operations 
CFO-PCFO 
RMl 
RM2 
Composite 
Proxies Calculated 
RMl: Abnormal production costs + (-1) 
Abnormal discretionary expenses or 
APROD+ (-1) ADISEXP 
RM2: (-1) Abnormal cash flows from operations 
+ (-1) abnormal discretionary 
expenses or 
(-1) ACFO + (-1) ADISEXP 
DA Discretionary Accruals Calculated 
Total accruals minus the predicted value of total 
accruals 
TA-PTA 
! • « • •.-.»>' "i 
•n:m'-
PPRODCOST 
Predicted 
Production 
Costs 
Calculated 
Calculate parameter estimates of the following 
equation and then use parameter estimates to calculate 
predicted values 
PROD= + a! (1/ AM) + a2 (SALES,)/ AM + a3 
(ASALESQ/ At.i +a4(ASALESt.1)/ At.i + s 
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Variables Source Notes on Calculations 
PDISEXP 
Predicted 
Discretionary 
Expense 
Calculated 
Calculate parameter estimates of the following 
equation and then use parameter estimates to calculate 
predicted values 
DISEXP/ AM = cto + a, (1/ AM) + a2 (SALES,)/ AM 
+a3 (SALESt.i)/ AM + £ 
PCFO 
Predicted 
Cash Flow 
from 
Operations 
Calculated 
Calculate parameter estimates of the following 
equation and then use parameter estimates to calculate 
predicted values 
CFOt/ AM = oto + a, (1/ AM) + a2 (SALES,)/ AM + a3 
(ASALES,)/ AM+ S 
PRODCOST Production Costs Calculated 
Cost of goods sold plus the change in inventory 
COGS+ AINV 
DISEXP Discretionary 
Expense Calculated 
Research and development expense plus advertising 
expense plus selling, general and administration 
expense. 
RD + ADV + SGA 
CFO 
Cash Flow 
from 
Operation 
Compustat 
SGA 
Selling, 
General and 
Administrativ 
e Expense 
Compustat 
ADV 
Advertising 
Expense Compustat 
COGS Cost of goods 
sold Compustat 
INV Inventory Compustat 
SALES Revenues Compustat 
re* -> 
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Variables Source Notes on Calculations 
TA 
PTA 
CA 
CL 
CASH 
STDEBT 
DEP 
A,., 
Total 
Accruals 
Predicted 
Value of 
Total 
Accruals 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Cash 
Short term 
debt 
Depreciation 
Compustat 
Calculated 
Calculated 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Total Accruals calculated as 
TA/ A,., = (ACA -ACL -ACASH +A STDEBT-
DEP)/AM where 
ACA is the change in current assets between year t 
andt-1; 
ACL is the change in current liabilities between year t 
andt-1; 
ACASH is the change in cash and short term 
investments between year t and t-1, 
ASTDEBT is the change in debt in current liabilities 
between year t and t-1; 
DEP is the year t depreciation and amortization 
expense and 
At_i is lagged total assets 
Calculate parameter estimates of the following 
equation for each 3 digit SIC group 
TA/ A,.] = d, / AM + d2 (ASALES,)/ AM + d3 PPE/ AM 
+ £ 
then plug parameter estimates into the following 
equation to calculate predicted values 
PTA = d, / AM + d2 [(A SALES - AREC)]/ At.i + d3 
PPE/ A,.! 
\ 
ACA is the change in current assets between year t 
andt-1; 
ACL is the change in current liabilities between year t 
andt-1; 
ACASH is the change in cash and short term 
investments between year t and t-1, 
ASTDEBT is the change in debt in current liabilities 
between year t and t-1; 
DEP is the year t depreciation and amortization 
expense 
At_i is lagged total assets. 
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Variables Name Source Notes on Calculations 
SIC 3 digit SIC 
SALES Revenues Compustat 
REC Receivables Compustat 
PPE 
Gross 
Property Plant 
and 
Equipment 
Compustat 
(3? II 
^Hft'£svHBMh&<*->J'r • '" "*££»£• •••" '*i'" »•••* " /WW'^P^Wr ^JSaBT'' Kra*ftf3£>w*£BMB*v8m 
M4F Analyst Following IBES Number of Analyst Following 
M/B Market-to-Book Compustat 
(Number of shares outstanding times share price at 
fiscal year-end, minus book value of common equity 
plus book value of total assets) to the book value of 
total assets. 
SIZE Size Compustat Calculated as natural logarithm of total assets or 
natural logarithm of total sales. 
Q Tobin's Q Compustat 
Sum of the market value of equity, liquidating value 
of the firm's outstanding preferred stock, value of the 
firm's short term liabilities net of its short term assets, 
and book value of the firm's long-term debt divided 
by the total assets of the firm. 
VOL Volume Compustat Total volume of trading for the year. 
RISK RISK CRSP Variance of the daily stock returns calculated over the 
current year. 
INST 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the percentage of stock 
held by institutional investors is greater than 50 
percent. 
LTD Long-Term Debt Compustat Long term debt scaled by total assets 
DELTA ExecuComp ExecuComp 
Sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, 
See Appendix A 
VEGA ExecuComp ExecuComp Sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility, 
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Variables Source Notes on Calculations 
See Appendix A 
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APPENDIX B 
DELTA AND VEGA CALCULATIONS* 
This appendix explains the calculation of DELTA and VEGA. The calculation follows 
the methodology discussed in Core and Guay (2002) and Guay (1999). The explanation is 
from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). 
Value and sensitivities for a single option 
The option value is calculated based on the Black-Scholes formula (Black and Scholes, 
1973) for valuing European call options, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for 
dividend payouts. 
Option value = Se-dtN(Z) - Xe-rtN(Z-oT(1/2)) 
where Z = [ln(S/X) + T(r-d+o2/2)]/oT(1/2) 
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
T = time to maturity of the option in years 
r = log of risk-free interest rate 
a = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
N( ) = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
DELTA= the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price 
= e"dtN(Z)*(price/100) 
VEGA = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock 
volatility 
= e"dtN'(Z)*ST(1/2)*0.01 
where N'(Z) is the normal density function. 
Value and sensitivities for portfolio of options 
Fiscal year end value and sensitivities of executives' option portfolios are calculated 
using the Core and Guay (2002) approximation method from ExecuComp data, which 
gives the realizable value (the potential gains from exercising all options on the fiscal 
year end price) and the number of options separately for both exercisable and 
unexercisable options and details of the current year's option grant. 
1. For the current year's grant, the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities are calculated 
using the above formulas. 
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1. For previously granted options, the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities for 
exercisable and unexercisable options are computed separately. 
a. The average exercise price is computed separately for the portfolio of 
exercisable options and unexercisable options. This is done in two steps. First, 
the realizable value is divided by the number of options, which gives the 
average of (stock price - exercise price). Then this number is subtracted from 
the stock price to arrive at the average exercise price. 
b. For exercisable options, the time to maturity is set to three years less than the 
time to maturity of the current year's options grants, or six years if no grant 
was made in the current year. 
c. For unexercisable options, the time to maturity equal is set to one year less 
than the time to maturity of the current year's options grants, or nine years if 
no grant was made in the current year. 
d. The Black-Scholes option value, delta and vega is calculated using the 
average exercise price and time to maturity. 
3. The delta of the manager's portfolio of stocks and options is calculated by adding the 
delta of restricted stock and shares held by the CEO to the delta of his options 
portfolio. The delta of stock = the fractional shareholding * 0.01 * stock price. The 
vega of the manager's portfolio of stock and options = vega of new options granted + 
vega of all exercisable options held + vega of all unexercisable options held. 
Following Guay (1999) the vega of restricted stock and shares is not calculated 
separately. 
* This appendix and data is taken in its entirety from Pennywell (2009). 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This table presents descriptive statistics. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat. 
ABPROD, ABDISEXP and ABCFO are abnormal production costs, abnormal 
discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flow from operations, respectively, where 
abnormal levels of all variables are defined as actual values minus the respective 
predicted values. DA is the value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified 
Jones approach. RM1 and RM2 are the composite real activities manipulation proxies. 
RM1 is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by negative one and added to 
production costs. RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations multiplied by 
negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. NAF is the 
number of analysts following the firm and M/B is the market to book ratio, calculated as 
the number of shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-end, minus book value 
of common equity plus book value of total assets to the book value of total assets. SIZE is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total sales and LTD is long term debt scaled by total 
assets. DELTA is the lagged dollar sensitivity of the CEO's option value with respect to 
a 1% change in stock price. VEGA is the lagged dollar sensitivity of the CEO's option 
value with respect to a 1% change in stock volatility. 
Variable Number of 
Observations 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ABPROD 15170 -0.0002815 1.23773 -79.28614 92.74367 
ABDISEXP 12646 -0.0005966 1.02945 -34.61654 51.80737 
ABDCFO 15297 -0.0004516 1.14316 -76.65733 81.75821 
RM1 12558 -0.00475 1.87505 -88.98814 90.23312 
12640 0.00573 1.82053 -115.74879 .81378 
:,Hfr'v3 
NAF 11841 10.92864 7.68666 1 47 
M/B 15393 2.07548 2.35945 0.29831 105.09039 
LTD 15364 0.18877 0.17219 0 4.39409 
SIZE 15392 7.18434 1.64465 -2.7181 12.65503 
DELTA 15444 724.85 73.4 250.19 998.6 
VEGA 15444 64.38543 51.29405 0.02927 1579 
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TABLE 2: CORRELATION MATRIX 
This table presents correlation statistics. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat. ABPROD, ABDISEXP, and ABCFO 
are abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flow from operations, respectively, 
where abnormal levels of all variables are defined as actual values minus the respective predicted values. DA is the value of 
discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones approach. RM1 and RM2 are the composite real activities 
manipulation proxies. RJV11 is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by negative one and added to production costs. 
RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations multiplies by negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses 
multiplied by negative one. NAF is the number of analysts following the firm and M/B is the market to book ratio, calculated 
as the number of shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-end, minus book value of common equity plus book value 
of total assets to the book value of total assets. LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets and SIZE is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total sales. DELTA is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price. 
VEGA is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
AB- AB- AB- DA RM 1 RM2 NAF M/B LTD SIZE DELTA VEGA 
PROD DISEXP CFO 
AB-
PROD 
AB-
DISEX 
P 
ABCFO 
DA 
RM1 
RM2 
NAF 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DELTA 
VEGA 
1 
-0.22729 
<0001 
-0.85197 
<.0001 
-0.05024 
<.0001 
0.01181 
0.1881 
0.01682 
0.0595 
-0.02871 
0.0019 
-0.01489 
0.0668 
0.00988 
0.2242 
0.0236 
0.0037 
0.00028 
0.9729 
-0.00138 
0.865 
0.22729 
<.0001 
1 
0.32523 
<.0001 
0.01322 
0.154 
-0.017 
0.058 
0.01282 
0.1494 
0.02121 
0.0359 
0.12067 
<.0001 
0.03878 
<0001 
0.12212 
<.0001 
0.00736 
0.4079 
0.04014 
<0001 
0.85197 
<0001 
0.32523 
<.0001 
1 
0.16485 
<.0001 
0.01101 
0.2195 
0.02145 
0.0159 
0.04266 
<.0001 
0.01567 
0.0526 
0.01198 
0.1391 
0.01125 
0.1641 
-0.0018 
0.8238 
0.01506 
0.0625 
0.05024 
<0001 
0.01322 
0.154 
0.16485 
<0001 
1 
-0.005 
0.5918 
0.00552 
0.5515 
0.00873 
0.358 
0.00204 
0.8093 
0.01037 
0.2205 
0.00458 
0.5881 
0.01894 
0.0251 
0.00254 
0.7635 
0.01181 
0.1881 
-0.017 
0.058 
-0.01101 
0.2195 
-0.005 
0.5918 
1 
-0.68263 
<.0001 
0.27899 
<.0001 
-0.03667 
<.0001 
0.02758 
0.0021 
0.52338 
<0001 
0.02987 
0.0009 
0.1682 
<0001 
0.01682 
0.0595 
0.01282 
0.1494 
-0.02145 
0.0159 
-0.00552 
0.5515 
-0.68263 
<0001 
1 
-0.4045 
<.0001 
-0.03522 
<.0001 
-0.00591 
0.507 
-0.4882 
<.0001 
-0.05925 
<0001 
-0.22643 
<.0001 
-0.02871 
0.0019 
-0.02121 
0.0359 
0.04266 
<0001 
0.00873 
0.358 
0.27899 
<.0001 
-0.4045 
<0001 
1 
0.0918 
<.0001 
-0.04164 
<0001 
0.56017 
<0001 
0.04134 
<.0001 
0.32892 
<.0001 
-0.01489 
0.0668 
0.12067 
<0001 
0.01567 
0.0526 
0.00204 
0.8093 
-0.03667 
<.0001 
-0.03522 
<0001 
0.0918 
<.0001 
1 
-0.1103 
<.0001 
-0.17106 
<.0001 
0.02081 
0.0098 
0.31153 
<.0001 
0.00988 
0.2242 
0.03878 
<0001 
-0.01198 
0.1391 
-0.01037 
0.2205 
0.02758 
0.0021 
-0.00591 
0.507 
-0.04164 
<.0001 
-0.1103 
<.0001 
1 
0.0973 
<.0001 
-0.03789 
<0001 
-0.09454 
<.0001 
0.0236 
0.0037 
-0.12212 
<.0001 
-0.01125 
0.1641 
-0.00458 
0.5881 
0.52338 
<0001 
-0.4882 
<0001 
0.56017 
<.0001 
-0.17106 
<.0001 
0.0973 
<0001 
1 
0.055 
<.0001 
0.35402 
<0001 
0.00028 
0.9729 
-0.00736 
0.4079 
-0.0018 
0.8238 
0.01894 
0.0251 
0.02987 
0.0009 
-0.05925 
<.0001 
0.04134 
<0001 
0.02081 
0.0098 
-0.03789 
<.0001 
0.055 
<.0001 
1 
0.19919 
<.0001 
-0.00138 
0.865 
-0.04014 
<.0001 
0.01506 
0.0625 
0.00254 
0.7635 
0.1682 
<.0001 
-0.22643 
<0001 
0.32892 
<.0001 
0.31153 
<.0001 
-0.09454 
<0001 
0.35402 
<0001 
0.19919 
<.0001 
1 
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TABLE 3: OLS REGRESSION TO GENERATE RESIDUAL FOLLOWING 
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression that generates 
residual analyst coverage. NAF is the number of analysts following the firm. SIZE is 
measured by the natural log of total sales. VOL is the volume of trading over the year 
and Q is Tobin's Q. RISK is measured as the variance of the daily stock returns 
calculated over the current year and NAF (-1) is lagged analyst following. *, **, and 
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
NAF= pi + p2 SIZE + P3 VOL + p4 Q + p5 RISK + p7 NAF (-1) 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
SIZE 
VOL 
Q 
RISK 
NAF(-l) 
R2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/-
+ 
0.87 
-1.07484*** 
0.29861*** 
0.000363*** 
0.11446*** 
0.39394* 
0.86297*** 
0.23363 
0.02865 
3.11E-05 
0.01481 
0.19321 
0.00567 
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TABLE 4: OLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST FOLLOWING ON REAL 
ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION 
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression that estimates the 
effect of analyst coverage on real activity earnings management using residual coverage 
as the proxy for analyst following. RM represents the various real activity manipulation 
proxies as indicated in the table where ABPROD and ABDISEXP are abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, respectively. NAFRESIDUAL is 
residual analyst coverage, the component of analyst coverage that cannot be explained by 
the controls. M/B is the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total 
assets. SIZE is measured by the natural log of total sales and DA represents the value of 
discretionary accruals. DELTA, the lagged sensitivity of CEO option grants to price 
changes, and VEGA, the lagged sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility 
capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard 
errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. 
RM = a l + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE+ a6DA 
+ a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
ABPROD 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
ABDISEXP 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
INTERCEPT 
NAFRESIDUAL 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R1 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.13048 
(0.05999) 
0.02575*** 
(0.00378) 
-0.00699*** 
(0.00112) 
0.06763*** 
(0.0198) 
0.00375*** 
(0.000723) 
-5.08457*** 
(0.42095) 
0.8537 
(0.0898) 
0.00002166 
(0.00010341) 
Yes 
.06 
0.10801 
(0.08894) 
-0.06277*** 
(0.01522) 
0.02753*** 
(0.00857) 
-0.08767 
(0.06744) 
-0.00521 
(0.00517) 
9.91653*** 
(3.4142) 
-0.02907 
(0.11727) 
-0.00032*** 
(0.00012) 
Yes 
0.08 
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TABLE 5: 2SLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST FOLLOWING AND REAL 
ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION 
This table reports the results of the two stage least squares (2SLS) regression of real 
activities manipulation and analyst following. 2SLS is used to address the potential 
endogeneity between real activity manipulation and analyst following. I am interested in 
the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management through real activity 
manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect the information 
environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following. In the first stage, I 
estimate analyst following (NAF). NAF is endogenized with the exogenous variables and 
the lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. RM represents the various real 
activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where ABPROD and ABDISEXP 
are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses respectively. M/B is 
the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets. SIZE is 
measured by the natural log of total sales and DA represents the value of discretionary 
accruals. DELTA, the lag of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and 
VEGA, lag of the sensitivity CEO option grants to stock volatility capture managerial 
incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust. 
NAF= pi + 02 RM + p3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1) 
RM = a l + a2 NAFFIT + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + 
a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted 
Sisn 
ABPROD 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
ABDISEXP 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
INTERCEPT 
NAF 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
Rz 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.10333 
(0.039268) 
0.001364*** 
(0.000424) 
-0.00684*** 
(0.001472) 
0.072121*** 
(0.15208) 
0.005443*** 
(0.002061) 
-5.11320*** 
(0.423805) 
0.083823** 
(0.038362) 
0.000036 
(0.000061) 
Yes 
0.06 
0.066908 
(0.074016) 
-0.00235*** 
(0.000815) 
0.026174*** 
(0.002888) 
-0.09437*** 
(0.030355) 
-0.01191*** 
(0.004112) 
9.956167*** 
(0.841568) 
-0.02646 
(0.075436) 
-0.00036*** 
(0.000121) 
Yes 
0.08 
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TABLE 6: POST SOX PARTITION: OLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST 
FOLLOWING ON REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION 
This table presents post SOX (after 2002) partitioned sample results of the ordinary least 
squares regression that estimates the effect of analyst coverage on real activity earnings 
management using residual coverage as the proxy for analyst following. RM represents 
the various real activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where ABPROD 
and ABDISEXP are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses 
respectively. NAFRESIDUAL is residual analyst coverage, the component of analyst 
coverage that cannot be explained by the controls. M/B is the market to book ratio and 
LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets. SIZE is measured by the natural log of the 
total value of sales and DA represents the value of discretionary accruals. DELTA, the 
lagged sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and VEGA, the lagged 
sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility capture managerial incentives to 
manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The significance levels represent standard errors that are heteroskedasticity 
robust. 
Panel 6A 
ABPROD = a l + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + o5 SIZE + a6DELTA + VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sign Post SOX 
ABPROD 
Coefficient 
Post SOX 
ABPROD 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAFRESIDUAL 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R^ 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.04326 
0.02128*** 
-0.00755*** 
0.04591*** 
0.00226*** 
-0.73283*** 
-0.01861* 
0.000130*** 
Yes 
0.46 
0.00831 
0.00126 
0.000698 
0.00425 
0.000421 
0.12841 
0.01031 
0.000012 
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TABLE 6 CONTINUED 
Panel 6B 
ABDISEXP = al + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6DELTA + VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sign Post SOX 
ABDISEXP 
Coefficient 
Post SOX 
ABDISEXP 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAFRESIDUAL 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R2 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
0.05458 
-0.03888*** 
0.02796*** 
-0.02971 
-0.00109 
2.55658*** 
-0.05647 
-0.00041129*** 
Yes 
0.08 
0.06416 
0.00826 
0.00763 
0.05915 
0.00425 
0.90545 
0.0771 
0.00007939 
54 
TABLE 7: POST SOX PARTITION: 2SLS REGRESSIONS OF REAL ACTIVITY 
MANIPULATION AND ANALYST FOLLOWING 
This table reports SOX (after 2002) partitioned sample results of the two stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression of real activities manipulation and analyst following. 2SLS is 
used to address the potential endogeneity between real activity manipulation and analyst 
following. I am interested in the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management 
through real activity manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect 
the information environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following. In 
the first stage, I estimate analyst following (NAF). NAF is endogenized with the 
exogenous variables and the lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. RM 
represents the various real activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where 
ABPROD and ABDISEXP are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses respectively. M/B is the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled 
by total assets. SIZE is measured by the natural log of total sales and DA represents the 
value of discretionary accruals. DELTA, the lag of the sensitivity of CEO option grants 
to price changes, and VEGA, lag of the sensitivity CEO option grants to stock volatility 
capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard 
errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. 
Panel 7A 
NAF= pi + P2 RM + p3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1) 
RM = a l + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sign Post SOX 
ABPROD 
Coefficient 
Post SOX 
ABPROD 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAF 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R2 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.02059 
0.001294*** 
-0.00742*** 
0.050182*** 
0.003441*** 
-0.77102*** 
-0.02189** 
0.000144*** 
Yes 
.43 
0.007978 
0.000084 
0.00046 
0.003151 
0.000397 
0.102655 
0.010027 
0.000014 
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TABLE 7 CONTINUED 
Panel 7B 
NAF= 61 + 62 RM + 63 SIZE + 64 VOL + 65 Q + 66 RISK + 68 NAF (-1) 
RM = a l + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sisn Post SOX 
ABDISEXP 
Coefficient 
Post SOX 
ABDISEXP 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAF 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
Rz 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
0.01572 
-0.00181*** 
0.026843*** 
-0.03466** 
-0.00449** 
2.644375*** 
-0.04813 
-0.00043*** 
Yes 
0.05 
0.052549 
0.000538 
0.00292 
0.020722 
0.002608 
0.687321 
0.066183 
0.000092 
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TABLE 8: COMPOSITE PROXIES: OLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST 
FOLLOWING ON REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION 
This table reports the results of the ordinary least squares regression of the composite 
proxies, RMl and RM2. RMl is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by 
negative one and added to production costs. RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows 
from operations multiplies by negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses 
multiplied by negative one. NAFRESIDUAL is residual analyst coverage, the component 
of analyst coverage that cannot be explained by the controls. M/B is the market to book 
ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets. SIZE is measured by the natural 
log of total sales and DA represents the value of discretionary accruals. DELTA, the 
sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and VEGA, the sensitivity CEO option 
grants to stock volatility capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and 
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance 
levels reflect significance using standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. 
Panel 8A 
RMl = al + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sign R M l 
Coefficient 
RMl 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAFRESIDUAL 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R* 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.25483 
0.0894*** 
-0.03428*** 
0.14888** 
0.00845 
-15.43077** 
0.14018 
0.00032192 
Yes 
0.09 
0.1387 
0.017 
0.0094 
0.0743 
0.0061 
6.6788 
0.2009 
0.0002 
57 
TABLE 8 CONTINUED 
Panel 8B 
RM2 = al + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sign RM2 
Coefficient 
RM2 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAFRESIDUAL 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R^ 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.14263 
0.06413*** 
-0.03264*** 
0.11026** 
0.01231** 
-11.5494** 
0.03393*** 
0.00028963** 
Yes 
0.11 
0.0907 
0.01561 
0.00899 
0.06771 
0.00576 
3.55719 
0.11988 
0.0001226 
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TABLE 9: COMPOSITE PROXIES: 2SLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST 
FOLLOWING AND REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION 
This table reports the results of the 2SLS regression of the composite proxies, RMl and 
RM2. I am interested in the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management through 
real activity manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect the 
information environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following. RMl 
is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by negative one and added to 
production costs. RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations multiplies by 
negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. In the first 
stage, I estimate analyst following (NAF). NAF is endogenized with the exogenous 
variables and the lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. RM represents the 
various real activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where ABPROD and 
ABDISEXP are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses 
respectively. M/B is the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total 
assets. SIZE is measured by the total value of sales and DA represents the value of 
discretionary accruals. DELTA, the lag of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to price 
changes, and VEGA, lag of the sensitivity CEO option grants to stock volatility capture 
managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard errors 
that are heteroskedasticity robust. 
Panel 9A 
NAF= pi + P2 RM + P3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1) 
RMl = al + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sign RMl 
Parameter Estimate 
RMl 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAF 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R^ 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.17612 
0.003745*** 
-0.03278*** 
0.159897*** 
0.016878*** 
-15.5172*** 
0.135378 
0.000376** 
Yes 
0.09 
0.105829 
0.001108 
0.003929 
0.041271 
0.005589 
1.145602 
0.103427 
0.000165 
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TABLE 9 CONTINUED 
Panel 9B 
NAF= 61 + 62 RM + 63 SIZE + 64 VOL + 65 Q + 66 RISK + 68 NAF (-1) 
RM2 = a l + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + al DELTA + a8 VEGA 
Variable Predicted Sign RM2 
Parameter Estimate 
RM2 
Standard Error 
INTERCEPT 
NAF 
M/B 
LTD 
SIZE 
DA 
DELTA 
VEGA 
Year Dummies 
R^ 
+/-
+/-
+ 
-
+ 
+/-
+ 
+ 
-0.1026 
0.002257*** 
-0.0311*** 
0.116573*** 
0.019562*** 
-11.5793*** 
0.031545 
0.000331*** 
Yes 
0.10 
0.075681 
0.000834 
0.002953 
0.031037 
0.004205 
0.860494 
0.077133 
0.000124 
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